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THE VIRGINIA FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT:
INADEQUATE ENFORCEMENT
Recognizing that an informed citizenry is essential to democracy,
all fifty states have enacted legislation requiring public officials to
conduct public business in open meetings.1 Virginia passed its
open meeting law, the Virginia Freedom of Information Act,2 in
1968 to ensure its citizens "ready access to the records in the cus-
1. See ALA. CODE § 13A-14-2 (1982); ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.62.310-.312 (1980); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 38-431 to -431.09 (1974 & Supp. 1983-1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2801 to
-2807 (1979 & Supp. 1983); CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11120-11131 (West 1980 & Supp. 1984); id.
§§ 54950-54961 (West 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-201 to -401 (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 1-18a, -21 to -21k (Supp. 1983-1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 10001-10002,
10004-10005 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 286.0105-286.011 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 36-80-1 (1982 & Supp. 1983); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 92-1 to -13 (1976 & Supp. 1982);
IDAHO CODE §§ 67-2340 to -2347 (1980 & Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, §§ 41-46
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-1-1 to 5-14-1.5-7 (Burns 1974 &
Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 28A.1-.9 (West 1978 & Supp. 1983-1984); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 75-4317 to -4320 (1977 & Supp. 1982); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.805-.850 (Baldwin 1980
& Supp. 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:4.1-:12 (West 1965 & Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 1, §§ 401-409 (1979 & Supp. 1983-1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 14 (1982 &
Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, §§ llA-11A/2 (West 1979 & Supp. 1983-1984);
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.261-.275 (West 1981 & Supp. 1982-1983) (provisions requir-
ing judiciary to comply when engaged in rulemaking or administrative activities held uncon-
stitutional in In re 1976 PA 267, 400 Mich. 660, 255 N.W.2d 635 (1977)); MINN. STAT.
§ 471.705 (1977 & Supp. 1983); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 25-41-1 to -17 (Supp. 1983); MO. ANN.
STAT. §§ 610.010.030 (Vernon Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-3-201 to -221 (1982);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-1408 to -1414 (1981); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 241.010-.040 (1979); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 91-A:l to :8 (1977 & Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:4-6 to -21
(West 1976 & Supp. 1983-1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-15-1 to -4 (1983); N.Y. PUB. OFF.
LAW §§ 95-106 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.9 to .18 (1983);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 44-04-19 to -21 (1978 & Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22
(Page 1978 & Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 301-314 (West Supp. 1982-1983);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 192.610-.990 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 261-269 (Purdon Supp.
1983-1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-46-1 to -10 (1977 & Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-4-
10 to -110 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 1-25-1 to -5 (1980); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 8-44-101 to -106 (1980); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (Vernon 1970
& Supp. 1982-1983); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 52-4-1 to -9 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 311-
314 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE §§ 2.1-340 to -346.1 (1979 & Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 42.30.010.920 (1972 & Supp. 1983-1984); W. VA. CODE §§ 6-9A-1 to -7 (1979 &
Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.81-.98 (West Supp. 1983-1984); Wyo. STAT. §§ 16-4-401
to -407 (1982).
2. VA. CODE §§ 2.1-340 to -346.1 (1979 & Supp. 1983). The Virginia statute and similar
state Freedom of Information Acts frequently are called "sunshine laws."
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tody of public officials and free entry to meetings of public bodies
wherein the business of the people is being conducted."' In draft-
ing and applying the open meeting law, however, the Virginia legis-
lature and the Virginia courts have failed to place sufficient em-
phasis on the enforcement provisions that ensure the Act's vitality.
This failure has been troublesome, particularly in the area of in-
junctions. Despite finding violations of the Act in several recent
cases, the Virginia Supreme Court decided that neither injunctions
nor other remedial measures were appropriate.4 By failing to rem-
edy these violations, the Virginia Supreme Court has frustrated
the policy underlying the Act-the public's right to free entry to
public meetings.
This Note discusses the remedies currently provided under the
Act and addresses the use of judicial discretion to fashion addi-
tional remedies for violations of the Act. The Note also proposes
and evaluates methods for effectively enforcing the Act. Finally,
the Note considers limitations on the exercise of judicial discretion
and the efficacy of alternative remedies.
JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN GRANTING STATUTORY RELIEF
Historically, a court of equity has had discretion to decree the
relief that it deems appropriate. A frequent criticism of the En-
glish equity courts was that the chancellor's exercise of discretion
was unpredictable, thereby fostering uncertainty in results.5 Never-
theless, the tenet survives that an appeal to equity is "an appeal to
the sound discretion which guides the determinations of courts of
equity."
'6
The judicial system generally subordinates equitable remedies to
remedies at law. The system regards an injunction as a unique
remedy and usually requires a plaintiff to show either that he will
suffer irreparable injury unless the court enjoins the defendant, or
3. Id. § 2.1-340.1.
4. See Nageotte v. King George County, 223 Va. 259, 288 S.E.2d 423 (1982); Marsh v.
Richmond Newspapers, 223 Va. 245, 288 S.E.2d 415 (1982).
5. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.2, at 32 (1973). This uncertainty
gave rise to the remark that "[e]quity is a roguish thing" measured by the length of the
chancellor's foot. Id. n.7 (quoting J. SELDON, TABLE TALK (F. Pollock ed. 1927)).
6. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1944). See also 0. Fiss & D.
RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 104 (2d ed. 1984).
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that alternative legal remedies, such as monetary damages, are in-
adequate.7 Legislatures, however, can eliminate the usual require-
ment that a plaintiff establish these prerequisites for injunctive re-
lief." Thus, by mandating the use of equitable remedies for
statutory violations, legislatures may limit or even override the ju-
diciary's freedom to exercise discretion in fashioning or denying in-
junctive relief.9 Courts, however, have been reluctant to find a leg-
islative intent to curtail judicial discretion to fashion suitable
remedies for statutory violations.10 Determining the existence and
the extent of a court's discretion in granting equitable relief for
statutory violations requires an examination of the statute's lan-
guage to discern the legislature's intent.
A court may rely on principles of statutory construction to de-
termine the legislature's intent. One principle of construction is
that a court should give words and phrases their ordinary mean-
ings.1" A court may also consider the provision as a whole to deter-
mine whether the legislature intended to limit the court's discre-
tion to grant equitable remedies. 2 Finally, a court may consider
the statute's purpose in deciding whether a particular type of relief
would further that purpose.13
7. 0. Fiss & D. RENDLEMAN, supra note 6, at 58-59.
8. See, e.g., State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Hyder, 114 Ariz. 544, 562 P.2d 717 (1977);
State v. O.K. Transfer Co., 215 Or. 8, -, 330 P.2d 510, 513 (1958) (usual prerequisites for
equitable relief not necessary in special statutory proceedings).
9. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 524, 533
(1982).
10. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982) ("Congress may inter-
vene and guide or control the exercise of the courts' discretion, but we do not lightly assume
that Congress has intended to depart from established principles.").
11. See Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 404, 131 S.E.2d 271 (1963). If
the statute's meaning is clear, no further principles of statutory construction will come into
play. See id. at 404, 131 S.E.2d at 273. Legislative use of the words "shall" and "must"
establishes mandatory provisions that a court must follow; the words "may" or "authorizes"
create directive or permissive measures not binding upon a court. See, e.g., Sheftic v. Boles,
295 F. Supp. 1347, 1348 (N.D. W. Va. 1969); Schmidt v. City of Richmond, 206 Va. 211, 218,
142 S.E.2d 573, 578 (1965). See generally 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 46.01 (4th ed. 1973).
12. See, e.g., Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944); Mason & Dixon Lines v.
Commonwealth, 185 Va. 877, 886, 41 S.E.2d 16, 20 (1947). See generally 2A J. SUTHERLAND,
supra note 11, § 46.05.
13. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 316 (1982) (concluding that the
statutory scheme did not limit the courts' traditional equitable discretion); Gough v. Shaner,
197 Va. 572, 575, 90 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1955) (a court must consider the object of the statute
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The Virginia Supreme Court has recognized the discretion of
lower courts to decide whether equitable relief is an appropriate
remedy for violations of the Virginia Freedom of Information
Act. 4 The court has failed, however, to define the lower courts'
discretionary limits and to clarify the circumstances under which
the courts may exercise their discretion. 5 In contrast, the United
States Supreme Court has defined more clearly the judiciary's dis-
cretion to fashion equitable remedies for statutory violations. In
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 8 the United States Supreme Court estab-
lished guidelines for determining the boundaries of a court's dis-
cretion to grant equitable relief for the violation of a statute. In
Hecht, the Court held that violation of the Emergency Price Con-
trol Act 17 did not require injunctive relief although the statute pro-
vided for such a remedy.18
In Hecht, an investigation revealed that, by overcharging on cer-
tain goods and by failing to maintain proper records, the Hecht
Company had violated the Emergency Price Control Act and a reg-
ulation promulgated under the Act.' The Act provided that "a
permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other or-
der shall be granted without bond" upon violation of the Act.20 De-
spite the Act's use of the mandatory word "shall," the Court held
that the phrase "or other order" indicated the availability of alter-
native remedies, giving the trial court discretion to award relief
other than an injunction.2 ' Although the government had sought
an injunction, the Court reasoned that a lower court might view
some other order as more appropriate.22 The Court concluded that
Congress would have eliminated judicial discretion expressly, if
Congress had intended to do so:
We cannot but think that if Congress had intended to make
and the purpose to be accomplished).
14. See, e.g., Nageotte v. King George County, 223 Va. 259, 288 S.E.2d 423 (1982); Marsh
v. Richmond Newspapers, 223 Va. 245, 288 S.E.2d 415 (1982).
15. See infra notes 69-91 and accompanying text.
16. 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
17. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (repealed 1947).
18. 321 U.S. at 331.
19. Id. at 324.
20. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 205(a), 56 Stat. 23, 33 (repealed 1947).
21. 321 U.S. at 328.
22. Id.
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such a drastic departure from the traditions of equity practice,
an unequivocal statement of its purpose would have been made.
We are dealing here with the requirements of equity practice
with a background of several hundred years of history..... The
essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chan-
cellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of
the particular case. . . We do not believe that such a major
departure from that long tradition as is here proposed should be
lightly implied.23
The Court recognized that a lower court's discretion to fashion
equitable decrees was limited, however, and warned that the judi-
ciary must exercise its discretion "in light of the large objectives of
the Act."' 24 A court must defer to the legislature's deteimination of
the conduct that should be prohibited, but may use its discretion
to grant any order that it deems appropriate to enforce compliance
with the statutory standard of conduct.25
In Hecht, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia had determined that an injunction was unnecessary be-
cause the Hecht Company's conduct before and after the violations
indicated that the company would comply with the statute in the
future.26 Based on this determination, the district court dismissed
the complaint.2 7
The Supreme Court found that the district court had discretion
to deny injunctive relief under these circumstances, but remanded
the case for a determination of whether the district court abused
its discretion in dismissing the action.28 Thus, although the trial
court had discretion to choose the appropriate equitable remedy,
its decision not to grant any relief may have been an abuse of dis-
cretion if the decision encouraged noncompliance with the statute.
In Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,29 the United States Supreme
Court reexamined the role of judicial discretion in granting injunc-
tive relief under a statute. In Weinberger, the Court held that the
23. Id. at 329-30.
24. Id. at 331.
25. See generally Plater, supra note 9, at 524.
26. 321 U.S. at 325-26.
27. Id. at 326.
28. Id. at 331.
29. 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
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Federal Water Pollution Control Act 0 did not require the issuance
of an injunction to prohibit the Navy's discharge of ordnance into
waters off the coast of Puerto Rico. 1
The Navy had used an island off the coast of Puerto Rico for
weapons training, which resulted in the discharge of ordnance into
the sea.3 2 The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the naval operations be-
cause the Navy conducted the exercises without obtaining a per-
mit."3 The United States District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico had found that the Navy had violated the Act by discharging
ordnance into the waters without a permit from the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).3 The court ordered the Navy to apply
for a permit, but refused to enjoin the training operations pending
the EPA's consideration of the application. 5
The Supreme Court held that the Act did not eliminate com-
pletely a court's discretion to grant injunctive relief.36 The Court
interpreted the Act to allow whatever relief the trial court deemed
necessary to ensure compliance with the statute.37 An injunction
was not the only means of ensuring compliance because the Navy
could overcome the Act's prohibition against the discharge of pol-
lutants by obtaining the necessary permit from the EPA." Neither
30. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
31. 456 U.S. at 320. The Act does not mention specifically the availability of injunctive
relief.
32. Id. at 307.
33. Id. at 306-07. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act requires a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permit for the "discharge of any pollutant." 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1311(a), 1323(a). The term "pollutant" includes munitions. Id. § 1362(6).
34. Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646 (D.P.R. 1979), modified, 643 F.2d 835 (1st Cir.
1981), rev'd sub nom. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
35. 456 U.S. at 309-10.
36. Id. at 316. The Court observed that the Act allowed the EPA Administrator to seek
relief sufficient to bring about compliance with the Act and reasoned that "Congress did not
anticipate that all discharges would be immediately enjoined." Id. at 317-18.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 315. The Court distinguished Weinberger from TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978), in which the Court found that Congress had eliminated the courts' traditional dis-
cretion. In Hill, the Court concluded that "one would be hard pressed to find a statutory
provision whose terms were any plainer." Id. at 173. A refusal to enjoin the action in Hill
would have ignored the explicit provisions of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1543 (1982), which required the protection of the habitats of endangered species. In
Hill, the construction of a dam would have destroyed the habitat of the snail darter, a spe-
cies of perch, thus frustrating the purpose of the Endangered Species Act. Commenting on
Hill, the Supreme Court stated in Weinberger that "[tihe purpose and language of the stat-
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the statutory scheme 9 nor the legislative history4" of the Act indi-
cated that Congress intended to restrict a court's discretion to
fashion appropriate relief.
Hecht and Weinberger indicate that a court generally retains the
discretion to decide whether injunctive or other equitable relief is
the proper remedy for a statutory violation. A court retains this
discretion unless the legislature removes it by expressly mandating
the issuance of an injunction for statutory violations, or unless an
injunction is the only relief that will ensure compliance with the
statute. If a statute does not preclude a court from exercising its
discretion, the court can fashion any equitable remedy that will
further the statute's substantive purposes. In cases arising under
the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, the Virginia Supreme
Court has used its discretion freely, but has denied injunctive
relief.
REMEDIAL PROVISIONS OF THE VIRGINIA FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT
Although the Virginia Freedom of Information Act was enacted
in 1968, it was amended to its current form in 1976. The Act's orig-
inal enforcement provision stated that "[a]ny person . . . denied
the rights and privileges conferred by this chapter may. . . peti-
tion for injunction or mandamus, supported by an affidavit show-
ing good cause .... '"41 The presence of permissive language indi-
cated that the General Assembly did not intend that a court
should issue an injunction automatically upon finding a violation
of the Act.42 The word "may" referred to the petitioner's right to
seek an injunction, rather than the court's duty to issue an injunc-
tion if a violation occurred. The Act contained no directive lan-
guage concerning a court's duty to issue an injunction. The phrase
"supported by an affidavit showing good cause" also indicated that
the court could exercise discretion in deciding whether an injunc-
ute limited the remedies available to the District Court; only an injunction could vindicate
the objectives of the Act." 456 U.S. at 314.
39. 456 U.S. at 315-16.
40. Id. at 319.
41. VA. CODE § 2.1-346 (1968) (amended 1976 & 1978).
42. See supra note 11.
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tion was appropriate. This phrase suggested that the court re-
tained at least the discretion to determine whether an affidavit
supporting a petition showed good cause.43
Another provision of the Act, pertaining to the results of execu-
tive or closed meetings, provided that
[n]o resolution, ordinance, rule, contract, regulation or motion
adopted, passed or agreed to in an executive or closed meeting
shall become effective unless such public body, following such
meeting, reconvenes in open meeting and takes a vote of the
membership on such resolution, ordinance, rule, contract, regu-
lation or motion.44
By using the mandatory word "shall," the General Assembly
clarified its intent that courts must declare certain governmental
actions void if the public body does not comply with the Act. In-
validating a prohibited action was originally the only mandatory
method of effectuating the Act's primary purpose of open govern-
ment. Thus, a court might exercise discretion in refusing to enjoin
closed meetings, but could not exercise discretion in determining
the validity of actions taken at the meetings.
Before its amendment in 1976, the Act did not clarify the cir-
cumstances in which Virginia courts should grant an injunction. As
previously noted, the only phrase in the Act that indicated the
General Assembly's intent regarding a court's exercise of discretion
stated that a plaintiff should support his petition for an injunction
with an affidavit showing good cause. 45 In WTAR Radio-TV Corp.
v. City Council,46 the Virginia Supreme Court relied on the good
cause provision to deny injunctive relief.
In WTAR, the petitioner, a broadcasting corporation, alleged
that the Virginia Beach City Council violated the Virginia Free-
dom of Information Act by holding two closed meetings to discuss
topics that should have been discussed in open meetings. 7 On one
43. A court also may have had discretion to determine whether an injunction was the only
method of ensuring compliance with the Act. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 29-40.
44. VA. CODE § 2.1-344(c) (1979) (amended 1980 & 1982).
45. VA. CODE § 2.1-346 (1968) (amended 1976 & 1978). This provision apparently allowed
a plaintiff to seek an injunction without establishing that the remedy at law was inadequate,
a traditional prerequisite for equitable jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
46. 216 Va. 892, 223 S.E.2d 895 (1976).
47. Id. at 893-94, 223 S.E.2d at 897.
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occasion, the council adopted a resolution calling for a closed meet-
ing purportedly to discuss topics exempted from the Act's disclos-
ure requirements.48 Before the meeting, the council did not iden-
tify publicly the matters to be discussed, and the petitioners
learned later that the Act did not permit private discussions of the
topics actually raised at the closed meeting.49 At a subsequent
closed meeting, the council again addressed subjects that the Act
did not exempt from the open meeting requirements."
Seeking to stop this pattern of circumvention, the plaintiffs peti-
tioned the court to enjoin the city council from holding any closed
meeting unless the council specifically stated the meeting's pur-
pose.5 1 To determine whether an injunction was appropriate, the
court focused on whether the plaintiffs supported their petition
with an affidavit showing good cause.52 The court determined that
the purpose of an injunction was to deter additional violations,s
and stated that the propriety of an injunction depended on the
probability that the offender would commit a subsequent viola-
tion.5 4 Although evidence of past wrongful conduct might permit
the inference that the misconduct would continue, the court as-
serted that this inference alone did not constitute the reasonable
probability of future misconduct necessary to justify an injunc-
tion. 5 The court held that the plaintiff's affidavit failed to show
good cause because the plaintiff did not present evidence to rebut
the presumption that the defendant would comply with the law in
the future.56 The court stated that, contrary to the plaintiff's con-
tention, the court's holding did not render the Act unenforceable;
injunctive relief would be granted upon an adequate showing of
48. Id. at 893, 223 S.E.2d at 897. The Act permitted closed meetings for discussions of
such matters as the administration of public employees, student discipline, acquisition of
real property for public purposes, and consultation with legal counsel. VA. CODE § 2.1-344
(1973) (amended 1979, 1980, 1981 & 1982).
49. 216 Va. at 894, 223 S.E.2d at 897.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 894, 223 S.E.2d at 897-98.
53. Id. at 894, 223 S.E.2d at 898.
54. Id. at 894-95, 223 S.E.2d at 898.
55. Id. at 895, 223 S.E.2d at 898.
56. Id.
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good cause.5"
The court in WTAR did not specify the steps that a plaintiff
should take to present evidence of a reasonable probability that
the defendant would violate the Act in the future.5 8 If evidence of
past violations is insufficient to rebut the presumption of the de-
fendant's future compliance with the Act, then the plaintiff's con-
tention that the court's decision would render the Act unenforce-
able was justified. The court recognized this problem and closed its
opinion by noting that "[w]hether the enforcement provisions of
the Act should be amended, and if so, in what manner, are matters
of public policy solely within the jurisdiction of the General
Assembly." 9
Legislative Reaction to WTAR
Following the court's decision in WTAR, the Virginia General
Assembly amended the Act's enforcement provisions.0° Although
no record exists of the amendment's legislative history, the timing
suggests that the General Assembly amended the Act in response
to the decision in WTAR. By amending the Act, the General As-
sembly apparently sought to clarify the circumstances in which a
court should issue an injunction. The amendment provided that a
plaintiff's petition for injunctive relief must set forth "with reason-
able specificity" the circumstances surrounding the denial of the
plaintiff's rights under the Act. 1 Thus, the legislature relaxed the
criteria for injunctive relief by clarifying the "good cause" require-
ment which the court in WTAR used to deny an injunction.
More significantly, the amendment provided that "[a] single in-
stance of denial of such rights and privileges conferred by this
chapter shall be sufficient to invoke the remedies granted
herein. '0 2 This change revealed a legislative intent different from
that which the Virginia Supreme Court found in WTAR. In
WTAR, the court had held that a single violation suggested, but
57. Id. at 895-96, 223 S.E.2d at 898.
58. See id. In the court's opinion, even two past violations apparently would not have
established a reasonable probability that the defendant would commit another violation.
59. Id. at 896, 223 S.E.2d at 898.
60. 1976 Va. Acts 709 (codified at VA. CODE § 2.1-346 (1979)).
61. VA. CODE § 2.1-346 (1979).
62. Id.
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did not establish conclusively, that violations would recur, and that
a single violation was not sufficient grounds for an injunction. In
amending the Act, however, the General Assembly stated that a
single violation did constitute sufficient grounds to support an
injunction . 4
The amendment also provided that a petitioner could recover
litigation costs and attorney's fees, presumably to encourage citi-
zen enforcement of the Act.65 The General Assembly also added a
new section, entitled "Violations and Penalties," which provides
that a court "shall impose" a civil fine if a defendant violates the
Act "willfully and knowingly." 66 The amendment's mandatory lan-
guage does not permit the use of judicial discretion in determining
whether to impose a civil fine if the court finds a willful violation.6
The amendment of the Act sought to strengthen the enforce-
ment measures in several significant ways. It relaxed the require-
ment that a plaintiff show good cause to obtain an injunction,
made suits to enforce the Act less costly, and added a stronger
mandatory remedial measure in the form of civil fines. These
changes reflected the dissatisfaction of the General Assembly with
the Virginia Supreme Court's refusal in WTAR to grant injunctive
relief under the Act's original enforcement provision. 8
63. 216 Va. at 895, 223 S.E.2d at 898.
64. Arguably, the amended passage removed the court's equitable discretion to grant re-
lief based on the legislature's use of the directive word "shall." Two factors, however, sug-
gest that the General Assembly did not intend to make injunctive relief mandatory. First,
the amendment did not require courts to take specific action. Second, the penalties provi-
sion stated that a court must impose a fine for a willful violation even if it does not award a
writ of mandamus or injunctive relief. VA. CODE § 2.1-346.1 (1979). Thus, the General As-
sembly indirectly indicated its intent that a writ of mandamus or an injunction need not be
granted to remedy every violation of the Act. The legislature did not specify, however, the
factors that a court should consider in deciding whether to issue an injunction.
65. VA. CODE § 2.1-346 (1979). Without this provision, an enforcement action is prohibi-
tively expensive for most private citizens because they lack the financial resources that
groups such as the media possess.
66. Id. § 2.1-346.1 (1979).
67. Id. The word "shall" indicates that imposition of a civil fine is mandatory. See id. The
amount of the fine, however, is left to the court's discretion. Arguably, the imposition of a
nominal fine would be an abuse of judicial discretion.
68. Another bill recently passed by the General Assembly indicates dissatisfaction with
the Virginia Supreme Court's holding in Roanoke City School Bd. v. Times-World Corp.,
226 Va. 176, 307 S.E.2d 256 (1983). In Times-World, the court found that a prearranged
telephone conference call between all members of the school board did not constitute a
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The Virginia Supreme Court's first opportunity to interpret the
amended enforcement section came in Marsh v. Richmond News-
papers.6 9 In Marsh, Richmond Newspapers alleged that the Rich-
mond City Council had violated the Virginia Freedom of Informa-
tion Act by improperly convening an executive session and by
discussing subjects during the closed session that did not fall
within the "legal matters" exemption of the Act.70 Richmond
Newspapers sought to enjoin the council from closing future meet-
ings, and sought to recover costs and-if the court found that the
violations were willful and knowing-civil fines against the council
members.7 1
The trial court found that the council had committed both of
the violations alleged in the petition, and granted a permanent in-
junction.7 2 On appeal, however, the Virginia Supreme Court held
that the council had not violated the Act, but affirmed the trial
court's conclusion that the council discussed topics outside the
scope of the Act's "legal matters" exemption.7 3 The Virginia Su-
preme Court also held that by granting an injunction, the trial
court had abused its discretion. 4
In reaching its decision, the court considered the effect of the
1976 amendment. The court interpreted the amendment as "re-
vers[ing] the presumption, which controlled our decision in
WTAR, that a public official will obey the law."'7 5 Nevertheless, the
court reasoned that several factors rendered the trial court's deci-
meeting for purposes of the Freedom of Information Act. Thus, the school board was able to
avoid the Act's requirement for open meetings. The bill, which amends the Freedom of
Information Act, will take effect on July 1, 1984, and specifically precludes meetings con-
ducted through telephone conferences or any other "means where the members are not
physically assembeled to discuss or transact public business." H.B. 24, Va. Gen. Assembly
(1984).
69. 223 Va. 245, 288 S.E.2d 415 (1982).
70. Id. at 249-52, 288 S.E.2d at 416-19. The plaintiffs claimed that the council's motion to
go into executive session did not state specifically the purpose of the closed meeting and
thus violated the amendment to § 2.1-346 of the Act. See 223 Va. at 254, 288 S.E.2d at 420.
71. 223 Va. at 249, 288 S.E.2d at 417.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 255-56, 288 S.E.2d at 420-21. The council entered executive session to discuss
the construction of an interstate highway and the possibility of potential litigation concern-
ing "annexation immunity" laws. The trial court found that no potential litigation was dis-
cussed in the meeting. Id.
74. Id. at 258, 288 S.E.2d at 422.
75. Id. at 257-58, 288 S.E.2d at 422.
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sion to issue an injunction inappropriate. First, the trial court had
awarded injunctive relief because it found two violations, but the
Virginia Supreme Court found only one. Second, although the trial
court could have inferred from a single violation that future viola-
tions would follow, the trial court had observed that repeated vio-
lations were unlikely.7 s The supreme court stated that, before a
court issues an injunction, the plaintiff must demonstrate that fu-
ture violations are probable.7 The supreme court interpreted the
1976 amendment as allowing a court to infer from a single viola-
tion that more violations would follow, 7 1 but because the trial court
in Marsh had not made this inference, the supreme court found
that no justification existed for an injunction.79
Despite the 1976 amendment, the supreme court in Marsh relied
on the same grounds that it had in WTAR to determine whether
an injunction was a proper remedy for a violation of the Act. In
both cases, the relevant consideration was the probability of future
violations. In both cases the court decided that a prior violation
merely permitted-but did not require-a court to infer that viola-
tions would recur. In Marsh, the supreme court did not elaborate
on the factors that it considered in deciding to overturn the award
of injunctive relief. The court discussed the defendants' good
faith,80 but did not cite any evidence to support its finding that the
council had acted in such a manner.
In Nageotte v. King George County,8s a companion case to
Marsh, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's deci-
sion to deny an injunction despite the defendants' violations of the
Act. In Nageotte, two citizens alleged that motions by the Board of
Supervisors of King George County to meet in executive session
76. Id. at 258, 288 S.E.2d at 422. The trial judge commented that the council members
"did not mean 'to do anything wrong"' and that a violation was not likely to happen again.
Id. at 257, 288 S.E.2d at 422. The trial judge also expressed misgivings about awarding an
injunction against persons who acted sincerely, though improperly. Id.
77. Id. at 258, 288 S.E.2d at 422.
78. Id.
79. Id. The trial court order also had established procedures for the council to follow in
closing future meetings. The supreme court found no need to comment on the procedures,
which fell within the injunction. Finally, the supreme court did not discuss the trial court's
failure to award attorneys' fees, an issue that the plaintiffs had not raised on appeal. Id.
80. Id. at 257, 288 S.E.2d at 421.
81. 223 Va. 259, 288 S.E.2d 423 (1982).
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were not specific and did not comply adequately with the Act's
provisions." The plaintiffs asked the trial court to enjoin future
violations, award costs and attorneys' fees, impose a civil fine, and
invalidate actions taken at the closed meeting.8 3
The trial court found that the supervisors had violated the Act,
but considered the violations insufficient to entitle the plaintiffs to
injunctive relief. The trial court merely cautioned the supervisors
to state the purpose of an executive session with greater specificity
in the future.8 4 The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's ruling that the defendants had violated the Act and the
trial court's refusal to grant the requested relief.8 5 The court saw
"no necessity for enlarging [the trial court's] suggestion into the
formal structure of an injunction." 8 Consistent with its decision in
Marsh, the supreme court naintained that an injunction was an
unnecessary remedy because the defendants violated the Act in
good faith.s The court also noted that the violations were insub-
stantial.8 The court, therefore, weighed the insubstantial and in-
advertent nature of the violations against the evidence of multiple
violations and decided that the defendant would not violate the
Act in the future. Having reached this conclusion, the court rea-
soned that the requested relief was unnecessary.
Although the Virginia Supreme Court found one or more viola-
tions of the Act in WTAR, Marsh, and Nageotte, the court failed
to provide any remedy. The General Assembly's attempt to
82. Id. at 262-63, 288 S.E.2d at 424. Generally, the motions failed to specify the matters
about which the board sought legal advice. See id. at 264-65, 288 S.E.2d at 425.
83. Id. at 263, 288 S.E.2d at 424.
84. Id. at 267, 288 S.E.2d at 426.
85. Id. at 267, 269-70, 288 S.E.2d at 427-28. The supreme court did not invalidate the
actions that the board had taken at the closed meeting because the board later voted on the
same proposals at an open meeting. Id. at 267, 288 S.E.2d at 427. Because the violations
were not willful, the court also refused to impose civil fines upon the board members. Id. at
269, 288 S.E.2d at 428. The court did not award attorney's fees and costs, evidently because
the plaintiffs had proceeded pro se. Id. at 270, 288 S.E.2d at 428.
86. Id. at 269, 288 S.E.2d at 428.
87. Id. at 269-70, 288 S.E.2d at 428. The court observed that "[t]he awarding of injunctive
relief is generally discretionary" and that "a single violation of the Act is sufficient to permit
the granting of relief based on the inference that future violations will occur, but such an
extraordinary and drastic remedy is not to be casually or perfunctorily ordered." Id.
88. Id. The supreme court found that "[tihere were no discussions of nonexempt subjects
in the executive sessions and no decisions were made in such sessions." Id. at 269, 288
S.E.2d at 428.
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strengthen enforcement by amending the Act in 1976 had no per-
ceptible effect upon subsequent judicial decisions.
Several explanations exist for the judicial reluctance to apply the
statutory remedies. The supreme court may have disagreed with
the General Assembly's determination that injunctions would en-
sure compliance with the Act. Another explanation for the court's
reluctance to award injunctions may be that the court feared that
injunctions prohibiting elected officials from holding closed meet-
ings would interfere with the officials' legislative function. 9
Another possibility is that the court may have disagreed with the
Act's substantive purpose.Y0 Open government may not result in
efficient government if officials must function in full view of the
public. Political decisions often involve compromises on controver-
sial proposals. In many instances, deadlocks might be more harm-
ful than unpopular actions. Refusing to grant relief on this basis,
however, is an abuse of judicial discretion. As the United States
Supreme Court indicated in Hecht, a court cannot substitute its
judgment for the legislature's judgment concerning the conduct
that should be prohibited; a court must exercise its discretion in
light of the legislature's intent 1
Although the reasons for the Virginia Supreme Court's reluc-
tance to enforce the Act are unclear, two methods exist for improv-
ing the Act's enforcement mechanisms and particularly for clarify-
ing the use of injunctions as a method of enforcement. First, the
General Assembly could amend the Act to provide alternative rem-
edies, or to remove the judiciary's discretion in granting injunc-
tions, or to do both. Alternatively, the General Assembly could al-
low courts to exercise discretion, but could offer legislative
guidance by specifying the factors that a court should consider in
89. The court may have decided that the political process provides a better remedy by
allowing voters to remove public officials from office if the officials fail to hold open
meetings.
90. In Marsh, the Virginia Supreme Court indicated that it disapproved of the Act's en-
forcement section which provided that a single violation of the Act is sufficient to trigger an
injunction. The court observed that "in our research we have been unable to find such a
provision in the statutes of any other state." 223 Va. at 257, 288 S.E.2d at 422.
91. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944). See also Bunts Eng'g & Equip. Co. v.
Palmer, 169 Va. 206, 192 S.E.2d 789 (1937) (the judiciary's duty is to construe statutory
language, not to pass upon its wisdom); Plater, supra note 9, at 532 (a court does not have
discretion to allow prohibited conduct to continue).
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determining whether to issue an injunction. Both of these solutions
to the problem of inadequate enforcement could protect effectively
the public's interest in open government.
FACTORS RELEVANT TO A DETERMINATION WHETHER TO ISSUE AN
INJUNCTION
In Nageotte v. King George County92 and Marsh v. Richmond
Newspapers,3 the Virginia Supreme Court refused to grant in-
junctive relief on the ground that an injunction was an ineffective
remedy for good faith violations of the Act. In Nageotte, the insub-
stantiality of the violation also influenced the court's decision.9 4
The court should not have relied on these factors, either alone or
together, to infer that the defendants would not violate the Act in
the future, and should not have refused to award injunctive relief.
Instead, the court should have focused on the substantive interest
at stake-the interest in open government-and considered
whether the statutory remedy of an injunction would have fur-
thered that interest.9 5
The substantiality of a violation does not reflect whether a viola-
tor will comply with a statute in the future. Focusing on the sever-
ity of a single violation may be an appropriate way to determine a
violator's moral culpability for past misconduct, but it has little or
no bearing upon whether a court should issue an injunction. In
seeking an injunction, a plaintiff's primary objective is to compel
officials to comply with the Act in the future, rather than to punish
or compensate for past violations.9 The extent to which an indi-
vidual violates the Act does not indicate clearly the extent to
which he will comply with it in the future. 7 The Virginia Supreme
Court's refusal to take action after minor violations may encourage
defendants to violate the Act in more substantial ways in the
92. 223 Va. 259, 288 S.E.2d 423 (1982).
93. 223 Va. 245, 288 S.E.2d 415 (1982).
94. 223 Va. at 269-70, 288 S.E.2d at 428.
95. See 0. Fiss & D. RENDLEMAN, supra note 6, at 77.
96. See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 5, §§ 1.1, 2.10; 0. Fiss & D. RENDLEMAN, supra
note 6, at 58-59.
97. The substantiality of a violation might reflect a violator's good faith, which might in
turn correlate more closely with the probability of future compliance, but the relationship is
tenuous.
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future.
Good faith, like substantiality, also should not determine the
propriety of an injunction. In Nageotte and Richmond Newspa-
pers, the supreme court defined good faith broadly and, on mini-
mal evidence, concluded that the defendants acted in good faith.s9
This result diminishes the effectiveness of the Act. If a defendant's
good faith leads the court to refuse an injunction in the belief that
violations will not occur in the future, and if the statute does not
permit the court to assess fines for unintentional violations, 100 then
defendants will be more likely to ignore the Act. The court's re-
fusal to take action against officials who commit honest mistakes
removes any incentive for the officials to avoid careless, inadver-
tent violations of the Act.
One rationale for granting a remedy in the absence of an inten-
tional violation exists in the law of strict liability. The law attaches
a cost to harmful behavior, despite the defendant's lack of moral
culpability, in order to deter future harm by increasing the cost of
a dangerous activity.101 Like the law of strict liability, the Virginia
Freedom of Information Act protects an important interest, the
public's right to information about governmental actions. Ordina-
rily, harmful conduct results in a money judgment that both com-
pensates the victim and deters future misconduct. Because com-
pensating the entire public is impossible, however, money
judgments are an inadequate remedy for violations of the Act.
Moreover, courts should not allow public officials to buy violations
of the Act which would frustrate the Act's substantive purpose of
ensuring public access to information.
A violation of the Act should result in an injunction, which will
deter future violations and avoid the impracticalities of money
awards. An injunction will give public officials an appropriate in-
98. By its language, the Act indicates that the General Assembly did not intend that good
faith be a determinative element. See VA. CODE § 2.1-346 (1979). If the legislature intended
to characterize good faith as a determinative factor, it could have required that a court
"shall" issue an injunction if a single bad faith violation has occurred.
99. See Nageotte v. King George County, 223 Va. 259, 288 S.E.2d 423 (1982); Marsh v.
Richmond Newspapers, 223 Va. 245, 288 S.E.2d 418 (1982).
100. A fine may be imposed only for willful violations. VA. CODE § 2.1-346.1 (1979).
101. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 98 (4th ed. 1971).
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centive to observe the Act. A public official who is unsure whether
the Act allows him to close a meeting will have an incentive to
study the Act, rather than proceed in ignorance and claim that he
acted in good faith, because a second violation may lead to con-
tempt proceedings. Whether a defendant violates the Act in good
faith or bad faith, the same harm results to the public. The objec-
tive of enforcement, therefore, should be to prevent both good
faith and bad faith violations. The courts can reduce good faith
and bad faith violations by issuing injunctions any time officials do
not comply with the Act. This practice also will encourage other
public officials to become familiar with the Act, thus giving effect
to the Act's purpose.
The court can limit in two ways the extent to which a defendant
may raise a defense of good faith. The court can continue to define
broadly the concept of good faith, but require a defendant to
prove, in addition to good faith, other factors indicating that his
compliance in the future is likely and that an injunction is unnec-
essary. One factor that the court might consider is whether the de-
fendant discontinued the violation promptly and effectively.10 2 The
United States Supreme Court considered this factor in Hecht Co.
v. Bowles,103 in deciding whether an injunction would effectively
prevent the Hecht Company from committing additional violations
of the Emergency Price Control Act. Upon realizing its violations,
the defendant in Hecht corrected them immediately and took pre-
cautionary measures to ensure future compliance. 1 4 Reliance on
the defendant's prompt discontinuation of violations, however, is
probably not an appropriate or accurate method for determining
whether a defendant will comply with the Virginia Freedom of In-
formation Act in the future. Holding a closed meeting is not an
ongoing violation, like price overcharging. Thus, a court should not
consider the defendant's prompt cessation of a single violation as
determinative of whether future violations of the Freedom of In-
formation Act will occur.
Another factor that the courts might consider is whether the de-
102. See Comment, The Statutory Injunction as an Enforcement Weapon of Federal
Agencies, 57 YALE L.J. 1023, 1028 (1948).
103. 321 U.S. 321, 324 (1944).
104. Id. at 325-26.
[Vol. 25:487
THE VIRGINIA FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
fendant's attitude and reputation lend credence to his promise of
future compliance or whether the public body has engaged in a
pattern of noncompliance with the Act.105 Determining reputation
or establishing a pattern of noncompliance, however, is difficult.
Moreover, if reputation or a pattern of noncompliance were deter-
mined solely by an objective measure, such as the number of previ-
ous violations of the Act, a violator could commit multiple viola-
tions before the court found sufficient grounds for relief.10 6
Determining a general reputation in the community in a more sub-
jective manner would not demonstrate accurately whether viola-
tions of the Freedom of Information Act were likely to occur in the
future. Because of these difficulties, requiring a defendant to show
the presence of some factor in addition to good faith is not an ef-
fective means of reducing judicial reliance on the defendant's good
faith to justify the decision to deny an injunction.
A second means of minimizing the scope of a good faith defense
is to increase the burden of proving good faith. To avoid an injunc-
tion, a court could require defendants to demonstrate more con-
vincingly that they acted in good faith. The court, for example,
could require violators to show strong supporting evidence that
their noncompliance was inadvertent. A defendant could establish
good faith by presenting evidence similar to the evidence produced
in Hecht. Before violating the Emergency Price Control Act, the
Hecht Company had created a price control office in an effort to
ensure that the store complied with the regulation. 107 The complex
nature of the regulation confused employees and resulted in subse-
quent violations.10 8 After correcting the mistakes, the Hecht Com-
pany increased the staff in its price control office, returned
overcharges to identifiable customers and offered to contribute the
remainder to charity. 0 9 This behavior convincingly indicated the
defendant's good faith.
One serious drawback to increasing the burden of proving good
105. Federal courts have given weight to the defendant's reputation in several cases. See
Comment, supra note 102, at 1028.
106. Multiple violations, however, would indicate an absence of good faith. If this factor
were present, most courts probably would not inquire into the defendant's reputation.
107. 321 U.S. at 325.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 325-26.
1984]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
faith is that the court will find that more violations are in bad
faith; consequently, the court will subject a larger number of viola-
tors to civil fines for willfully violating the Act. Fines may be too
harsh a remedy for those violators who cannot establish a good
faith defense, but who have not acted willfully. Understandably,
courts may attempt to avoid imposing fines by straining to find
that these defendants acted in good faith. This approach would
lead to the same result that occurs under the current broad defini-
tion of good faith; courts would not grant a remedy when a viola-
tion occurs.
A final possibility is for courts to create two different sets of re-
quirements to decide the effects of good faith. The courts could
apply one standard to determine whether to impose a fine, and a
more demanding standard to determine whether to issue an in-
junction. Using two standards, however, probably would lead to
confusion and, thus, is also an unsatisfactory alternative.
Good faith, therefore, should not be a significant factor in a
court's decision to issue an injunction, whether the court considers
other factors or raises the requirements for proving good faith. The
best solution is to remove the court's discretion by legislation and
to make injunctions mandatory whenever a violation occurs.
AMENDMENT TO PROVIDE ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES OR REMOVAL OF A
COURT'S EQUITABLE DISCRETION
An amendment to the enforcement provision of the Virginia
Freedom of Information Act could achieve the Act's substantive
goals. The General Assembly could amend the Act to change the
manner in which courts apply the remedies currently provided. Al-
ternatively, the General Assembly could create new remedies for
violations of the Act, such as removal from public office or criminal
sanctions.
Injunctions
Rather than leaving injunctive relief to a court's discretion, the
General Assembly could make this remedy mandatory by changing
the wording of the statute.110 The General Assembly could amend
110. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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the statute to require an injunction regardless of the circumstances
surrounding the violation. The language would have to be specific
to remove any judicial doubt concerning the legislative intent."'
Thus, even if the courts were certain that defendants would com-
ply with the Act in the future, they could not refuse to grant
injunctions.
Injunctive relief has many remedial advantages that are realized
fully when an injunction is mandatory. Despite the frequently
stated view that injunctions are harsh and extreme measures,1 2 an
injunction is a moderate means of enforcing Freedom of Informa-
tion laws because it avoids the immediate imposition of criminal
sanctions or money damages for past harms. Essentially, an injunc-
tion merely directs the defendant to avoid future violations; the
threat of contempt proceedings if additional violations occur gives
the injunction its bite.113 Injunctions also provide an opportunity
for courts to clarify vague sections of the Act in a relatively pain-
less manner. Officials who violate the Act because its meaning is
uncertain are not subject to any remedy other than being enjoined
from repeating the violation. "
One potential problem in seeking injunctive relief in Freedom of
Information Act suits is that courts are reluctant to issue an in-
junction in the absence of past violations. The defendant, there-
fore, can commit with impunity at least one violation of the Act
before the interest of the public receives protection. 115 To amelio-
rate this problem, the General Assembly could amend the current
enforcement provision to allow a party to seek an injunction when-
ever he reasonably anticipates that a defendant will violate the
Act.1 " The existing statute does not require a violation to occur in
111. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Nageotte v. King George County, 223 Va. 259, 288 S.E.2d 423 (1982); Marsh
v. Richmond Newspapers, 223 Va. 245, 288 S.E.2d 415 (1982).
113. See Kalil, Florida Sunshine Law, 49 FLA. B.J. 72, 78 (1975). See generally 0. Fiss &
D. RENDLEMAN, supra note 6, at 58-59.
114. See infra text accompanying notes 123-24.
115. See Kalil, supra note 113, at 78; Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for
the "Right to Know", 75 HARv. L. REv. 1199, 1215 (1962). Of course, the court must impose
a civil fine if the defendant's initial violation is willful. See supra note 67 and accompanying
text.
116. Even without an amendment, the Virginia Supreme Court could interpret the ex-
isting statute to allow a court to grant injunctions when no previous violation has occurred.
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order for a court to award an injunction; it requires only that a
party show good cause to support the petition for an injunction.117
The Virginia Supreme Court, however, has interpreted this good
cause requirement as including proof of at least one previous viola-
tion.""s By specifically providing that a court must grant an injunc-
tion whenever a party persuades the court that a violation is likely
to occur, the General Assembly could reduce the number of viola-
tions of the Act that the public must endure before a court takes
action.
One criticism of good cause provisions is that proof of an immi-
nent violation of the statute is difficult in the absence of an earlier
violation."l 9 If public officials give advance notice of closed meet-
ings, however, a court should consider the likelihood of a violation
of the Act. The public should not have to endure the consequences
of a violation, which include seeking an injunction against further
violations and requesting that the court invalidate any nonexempt
actions taken at the closed meeting. 120
If the availability of an injunction is discretionary and a court is
allowed to predict future compliance, the public's interest in open
meetings will not be protected adequately.' 2 ' The Virginia Su-
preme Court has asserted that an injunction is an extreme rem-
edy,122 but the court's refusal to remedy violations does not serve
A Florida court interpreting Florida's sunshine law stated that a court may issue an injunc-
tion if a violation is imminent, even in the absence of a past violation. Times Publishing Co.
v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470, 476 (Fla. 1969).
117. VA. CODE § 2.1-346 (1979).
118. See Nageotte v. King George County, 223 Va. 259, 288 S.E.2d 423 (1982); Marsh v.
Richmond Newspapers, 223 Va. 245, 288 S.E.2d 415 (1982); WTAR Radio-TV v. City Coun-
cil, 216 Va. 892, 223 S.E.2d 895 (1976).
119. See Note, Texas Open Meetings Act Has Potentially Broad Coverage but Suffers
from Inadequate Enforcement Provisions, 49 TEx. L. REV. 764, 774 (1971); Comment, Open
Meetings in Virginia: Fortifying the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, 8 U. RICH. L.
REV. 261, 269 (1974).
120. The Virginia statute provides that no final action taken in violation of the Act will
become effective unless a vote is taken on the action in an open meeting. VA. CODE § 2.1-344
(1979 & Supp. 1983). Thus, a public body can frustrate the Act despite this provision by
improperly holding a closed discussion and then validating the action by taking a vote in an
open meeting with no open discussion. See infra text accompanying note 139.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 93-109.
122. See Nageotte v. King George County, 223 Va. 259, 288 S.E.2d 423 (1982); Marsh v.
Richmond Newspapers, 223 Va. 245, 288 S.E.2d 415 (1982); WTAR Radio-TV v. City Coun-
cil, 216 Va. 892, 223 S.E.2d 895 (1976).
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the public policies underlying the Act. To be effective, an enforce-
ment method must give defendants an incentive to stop violating
the substantive interests involved, and thus must pose some nega-
tive consequences. The advantage of an injunction is that its nega-
tive effect, contempt proceedings for subsequent violations, occurs
only upon the second violation rather than the first violation. 1
2 3
Thus, even if a court issues an injunction after a single violation,
the only necessary negative effect of the injunction is the political
embarrassment that a public official will suffer for violating the
Act. The offender does not face a fine, jail term, or removal from
office. For those who deliberately frustrate the public's right to
open government, political embarrassment is not an excessive or
unjust punishment. Moreover, to reduce the chance that an injunc-
tion may adversely affect officials acting in good faith, the General
Assembly could amend the Act to allow officials who are uncertain
about the legality of an action to seek a declaratory judgment to
determine whether the action is lawful under the statute.124
Civil Fine
In addition to permitting injunctions, the Virginia statute cur-
rently provides for a fine of not less than $25 nor more than $500
for willful and knowing violations. 125 Because a fine will not always
place a financial burden upon an official who knowingly violates
the Act, its effectiveness as a deterrent is questionable. But if a
monetary loss alone is not meaningful to an official, the adverse
publicity and political damage resulting from the levy of a fine
against him for a willful violation may serve as a strong
deterrent.'26
By permitting fines for knowing violations only, the statute pro-
tects innocent violators from personal liability and abates potential
damage to political careers. 2 7 The General Assembly could incor-
123. See Kalil, supra note 113, at 78; Note, supra note 115, at 1215.
124. Iowa currently permits officials to seek declaratory judgments under its sunshine law.
See IOWA CODE ANN. § 28A.6 (West Supp. 1983-1984).
125. VA. CODE § 2.1-346.1 (1979).
126. See Note, supra note 115, at 1215; Comment, Open Meetings Laws: An Analysis
and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 1151, 1182 (1974).
127. See VA. CODE § 2.1-346.1 (1979) ("if it finds a violation was willfully and knowingly
made, [a court] shall impose a civil [fine]").
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porate additional protection into the Act by providing that an offi-
cial will not be fined if he protests the action that is later found to
violate the Act and records his objection in the minutes of the
meeting at which the violation occurs.128 This measure would pre-
vent the Act from discouraging public service out of a fear of per-
sonal financial liability for misreading an ambiguous section of the
statute or when insufficient time exists to seek a declaratory judg-
ment. Moreover, the measure would protect officials who partici-
pate in a closed meeting after unsuccessfully attempting to open
the meeting to the public.
A civil fine performs an important function in the enforcement
scheme. Unlike invalidation, a fine affects individual officials
rather than the official action. 129 Unlike an injunction, a fine pun-
ishes offenders who deliberately violate the Act by denying public
access to meetings. A fine is not as harsh as crimnal sanctions or
removal from office, however, and is thus an appropriate measure
to take against first-time willful offenders.
Invalidation
In addition to providing injunctive relief and civil fines, the Vir-
ginia Freedom of Information Act states that no resolution, regula-
tion, or rule that is passed in a closed meeting will become effective
unless the public body reconvenes in an open meeting to vote on
the measure. 30 This provision is similar to other sunshine laws
that declare any action taken in violation of the statute to be void
or voidable.131 These provisions prevent public officials from bene-
fiting from unlawful conduct and protect the public from the re-
sults of decisions in which they took no part.1 32 Invalidation is
both a deterrent and a corrective measure, therefore, and despite
128. See Note, New Jersey's Open Public Meetings Act: Has Five Years Brought "Sun-
shine" Over the Garden State?, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 561, 575-76 (1981). For an example of such
a provision, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-17 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983-1984).
129. See Note, The Iowa Open Meetings Act: A Lesson in Legislative Ineffectiveness, 62
IOWA L. REv. 1108, 1137 (1977).
130. VA. CODE § 2.1-344(9)(c) (1979 & Supp. 1983).
131. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310 (1980); ARmZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-431.05 (Supp.
1983-1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2805 (1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 92-11 (1976).
132. See Note, The Minnesota Open Meeting Law After Twenty Years-A Second Look,
5 Wm. MrrCHELL L. REv. 375, 416 (1979).
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the complications that can result from invalidating official actions,
its effectiveness justifies its use as a means of enforcing the Act.
One frequent objection is that invalidation can affect contracts
and other actions taken in reliance on an official decision."' Two
measures can reduce the detrimental effects of invalidation. First,
the statute could provide exceptions to the invalidation provision
to protect matters that require stability and consistency, such as
actions involving the public debt.13 4 The General Assembly also
could set a time limit on the period following a violation during
which an invalidation action may be brought. 35 The period should
be relatively brief in order to minimize the delay before officials
can act on the decision, but the period must be long enough to
allow a reasonable time for a party to file suit.136
Whether good faith violations of the Act should be invalidated is
unclear.13 7 Those who believe that inadvertent violations should
not be invalid focus only on the deterrent value of invalidation.
Invalidation serves another important goal, however, that no other
method of enforcement can accomplish. Invalidation forces officials
to cure a decision made in violation of the Act. The substantive
purpose of the Act is to provide public access to official meetings
and, whether the violation was knowing or inadvertent, any action
that frustrates this purpose should be void.
Even if invalidation disrupts public business, invalidating only
bad faith violations will not reduce the disruption significantly. A
third party relying on a decision made at a closed meeting will not
know whether the public officials inadvertently violated the Act or
knowingly refused to follow it. Thus, invalidating only bad faith
133. See Note, supra note 115, at 1214; Note, supra note 119, at 776; Note, supra note
132, at 417; Comment, supra note 119, at 270.
134. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-7(b) (Burns Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-
44-105 (1980).
135. See Kalil, supra note 113, at 78; Note, supra note 129, at 1137; Note, supra note 119,
at 776; Comment, Invalidation as a Remedy for Open Meeting Law Violations, 55 Ot. L.
REV. 519, 531 (1976).
136. Several state statutes contain limitations periods. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 50-14-1
(1982 & Supp. 1983); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 92-11 (1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-15 (West
1976 & Supp. 1983-1984). These periods may be as short as twenty-one days. See, e.g.,
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 39, § 23B (West Supp. 1983-1984).
137. See Note, Pennsylvania's "Sunshine Law": Problems of Construction and Enforce-
ment, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 536, 554 (1975).
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violations will not reduce instability because of uncertainty over
the nature of a violation of the Act. If third parties have no way of
predicting which decisions are invalid, they will hesitate to rely on
any official action taken at a closed meeting.
The Virginia invalidation provision suffers from a problem that
weakens similar state statutes. Only final actions are invalid; delib-
erations held in violation of the Act are not. a'3  These provisions
often lead to informal votes in which the public body deliberates
privately and then brings the matter before the public for an im-
mediate vote without further discussion.139 This procedure de-
prives the public of knowledge about the reasons for the decision
and frustrates the Act's purpose. Invalidating these deliberations is
probably impractical,' 40 but the General Assembly could provide
that no action can be taken at a public meeting following closed
deliberations conducted in violation of the Act unless the matter is
reopened for full public discussion.
Criminal Sanctions
Another common enforcement procedure not contained in the
Virginia statute is the imposition of criminal sanctions.1 4 The se-
verity of this punitive means of enforcement accounts for its infre-
quent use. Even its unquestionable value as a deterrent does not
offset the harshness of punishing persons whose only misconduct is
holding a closed meeting. The object of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act is to make public officials responsive to the public, not to
create criminal liability. 42 Moreover, the procedural requirements
of criminal prosecutions, such as the reasonable doubt standard of
proof, make criminal proceedings more cumbersome than civil
actions.
138. The General Assembly amended the Act in 1980 to require that an action discussed
in closed session must "have its substance reasonably identified in the open meeting" before
a vote on the action. VA. CODE § 2.1-344 (Supp. 1982). This provision, however, does not
require public deliberation or discussion before the final vote.
139. See Note, supra note 129, at 1137; Comment, supra note 126, at 1181.
140. See Note, supra note 129, at 1137; Note, supra note 119, at 775; Comment, supra
note 119, at 270.
141. Other states have provided criminal sanctions in their sunshine laws. See, e.g., ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2807 (1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21k (Supp. 1983-1984); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 92-13 (1976).
142. See Comment, supra note 126, at 1178.
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Imposing criminal penalties for any violation of the Act is a par-
ticularly inappropriate way to deal with officials who inadvertently
violate the Act.143 Public officials should not suffer criminal pun-
ishment for violations resulting from an honest misreading of con-
fusing portions of the statute. Moreover, an official who cannot
raise a good faith defense to a criminal action will have to decide
on short notice whether to withdraw from the meeting and forego
the opportunity to vote or to remain at the meeting and risk crimi-
nal sanctions.4
Criminal penalties might defeat the purpose of the statute alto-
gether. Prosecutors might hesitate to bring criminal charges
against their political allies, 145 but might prosecute their political
opponents zealously. Thus the danger of potential abuse is signifi-
cant. Due to the risk of prosecution, officials also might hesitate to
test ambiguous sections of the statute. Finally, the potential for
criminal sanctions may discourage qualified people from seeking
public office. 146
These numerous disadvantages have led several states to reject
criminal provisions as a method of enforcing freedom of informa-
tion statutes. 147 One alternative that avoids many of the problems
of criminal sanctions, but carries the same strong deterrent effect,
is removal from office.
Removal From Office
Removal from office is gaining increased recognition and accept-
ance as an enforcement mechanism.1 48 This sanction is a strong de-
terrent because, like criminal penalties, it operates directly against
the violator rather than the official action.14 9 Several characteris-
143. See Kalil, supra note 113, at 77-78.
144. See Note, supra note 128, at 575-76.
145. See Kalil, supra note 113, at 78; Comment, supra note 126, at 1138; Comment, supra
note 119, at 269.
146. See Note, supra note 119, at 774.
147. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-7 (Bums Supp. 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 42:9 (West Supp. 1984).
148. Four states currently provide for removal from office in their open meeting statutes.
See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 92-13 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 28A.6(3)(d) (West Supp. 1983-
1984); MINN. STAT. § 471.705(2) (1977 & Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(H)
(Page 1978 & Supp. 1982).
149. See Wickham, Tennessee's Sunshine Law: A Need for Limited Shade and Clearer
1984]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:487
tics make removal from office more attractive than the imposition
of criminal penalties. Removal from office is less likely to raise con-
stitutional concerns 150 and avoids such criminal procedure require-
ments as proof beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimous jury
verdicts."5 Removal also does not stigmatize violators as criminals,
and may be an even more effective deterrent than criminal
sanctions. 52
Critics of removal provisions assert that the public can remove
willful violators through the normal electoral process. 15 The pub-
lic, however, cannot completely protect its interest in open govern-
ment through elections. 5 4 A removal from office provision prevents
violations by nonelected officials and by elected officials who are
not at the end of a term of office. 155 Another criticism of removal
provisions is that they may lead to the removal of a good faith
offender. 15 Limiting this sanction to situations involving repeated
violations would eliminate this unpalatable result.157 The sanction
could be imposed, for example, only after two or more violations
occur. 15  General agreement exists that a single violation could re-
sult from negligent rather than intentional action, but the commis-
Focus, 42 TENN. L. REv. 557, 569 (1975).
150. The United States Supreme Court has defined the process required for removing
government employees. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). In these cases, the Court
recognized a property interest in governmental employment that could not be infringed
without cause. Presumably, violation of a sunshine law constitutes sufficient cause to satisfy
the due process concerns. See Little & Tompkins, Open Government Laws: An Insider's
View, 53 N.C.L. REv. 451, 481-82 & n.11 (1975).
151. Because removal from office is a remedy based on equitable principles, a court may
employ equity procedures. See Little & Tompkins, supra note 150.
152. See Wickham, supra note 149, at 569-70; Note, supra note 132, at 412-13. Arguably,
a public official would prefer to pay a fine, or perhaps even serve a jail sentence, than leave
office under court order. See Little & Tompkins, supra note 150, at 481.
153. See, e.g., Kalil, supra note 113, at 78.
154. Id.
155. See Wickham, supra note 149, at 569; Note, supra note 129, at 1138; Comment,
supra note 126, at 1183.
156. See Comment, Entering the Door Opened: An Evolution of Rights of Public Access
to Governmental Deliberations in Louisiana and a Plea for Realistic Remedies, 41 LA. L.
REv. 192, 217 (1980).
157. See Kalil, supra note 113, at 78; Wickham, supra note 149, at 569.
158. See Wickham, supra note 149, at 569; Note, supra note 129, at 1138; Note, supra
note 132, at 412-13; Comment, supra note 126, at 1182-83.
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sion of several violations seldom results from inadvertence. 159 In
addition, the statute could grant the violator the right to a jury
trial. 60 A final criticism of removal is that it provides no enforce-
ment for the first and second offenses.6 Combining the removal
provision with the imposition of civil fines for first and second time
offenders would eliminate this problem.
Of the four states that currently have freedom of information
statutes providing for removal from office, two do not require re-
peated violations but leave removal to the discretion of the judge
or jury.16 2 The statutes in the other two states make removal
mandatory upon the third violation.163 Determining whether an of-
ficial violated the Act inadvertently or intentionally may not be
easy. Allowing removal on the basis of a single violation, therefore,
reduces the protection afforded good faith violators who should not
be subject to this harsh sanction. A multiple violation requirement
would protect public officials who act in good faith. Additionally,
the statute could provide that each violation must be established
in separate legal proceedings. This requirement would ensure that
the defendant received proper notice that further violations might
lead to his removal from office.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Virginia Freedom of Information Act has been inadequately
and ineffectively enforced. The lack of meaningful remedies, and
the exercise of excessive judicial discretion in applying them, ac-
count for this result. Several solutions to this problem exist. The
General Assembly should amend the Act to provide for mandatory
injunctive relief. Absent a prior violation, an injunction should be
granted whenever a party shows good reason for expecting that an
official will violate the Act. The Act also should provide that a
public official will be removed from office if a court finds willful
violations on at least two separate occasions. This provision also
159. See Note, supra note 132, at 413; Comment, supra note 126, at 1183.
160. See Wickham, supra note 149, at 569.
161. See Note, supra note 129, at 1138; Comment, supra note 156, at 217.
162. See HAWAn REv. STAT. § 92-13 (1976); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 121.22(H) (Page 1978
& Supp. 1982).
163. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 28A.6(3)(d) (West Supp. 1983-1984); MINN. STAT.
§ 471.705(2) (1977 & Supp. 1983).
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should guarantee the violator the right to a jury trial.
In addition to more precise remedies, the General Assembly
should provide certain safeguards for public officials. These should
include a provision allowing public officials to seek declaratory
judgments concerning the legality of contemplated actions. If a
public official unsuccessfully objects to the closing of a meeting
and enters that objection in the record, his participation in the
meeting should constitute only a good faith violation.
The General Assembly should require that any nonexempt mat-
ters discussed at a closed meeting be reopened for public debate
before final action. Any actions, including those taken in good
faith, should be ineffective if taken in violation of the Act. A brief
statute of limitations period should apply to suits filed to invali-
date an action taken at a closed meeting.6 Finally, the General
Assembly should provide an exception to invalidation for actions
that concern the public debt, and for similar matters requiring
stability.
Adopting these provisions will force public officials to give the
Act serious attention. The remedies will deter potential violators
and caution others to familiarize themselves with all aspects of the
Freedom of Information Act. Although some of the remedies are
potentially onerous, adequate safeguards will prevent unfair re-
sults. With thorough and effective remedial provisions, the Vir-
ginia Freedom of Information Act can secure the public's right to
information about governmental actions.
ELEANOR BARRY KNOTH
164. This relatively brief limitation period should apply only to invalidation actions, and
should not apply to judicial proceedings against violators of the Act.
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